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From all the disciplines in the Humanities, political philosophy seems to be the natural home base for ideals. 
History provides us with several appealing examples: The French revolution took place in name of Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity, while Marxists were united under the slogan From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs.1 Of course, such ideals are never completely realizable. Nevertheless they are 
essential notions in political philosophy because they enable to extend “what are ordinarily thought of as the 
limits of practical political possibility.”2 As such, ideals provoke our imagination and function as guiding 
ideas in the transition from the status quo towards an ideal state of the world. Indeed, especially within 
political philosophy, ideals are helpful tools because they “transcend concrete formulation and 
implementation by way of principles and rules, they are open to continuous reformulation in the light of new 
circumstances.”3  
 This chapter discusses the ideal of equality in political philosophy. Equality can be discussed at different 
levels of abstraction, following the distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception.’4 At a high level of 
abstraction we refer to equality as a concept; at a lower level of abstraction, we refer to the conception of 
equality as a particular interpretation of that concept. As Dworkin explains: “At the first level agreement 
collects around discrete ideas that are uncontroversially employed in all interpretations; at the second the 
controversy latent in this abstraction is identified and taken up.”5 Concepts are phrased in such a high level 
of abstraction that possible disagreements about their interpretation and implementation are concealed. Only 
when they are made more concrete, that is, translated into conceptions, these disagreements come to the fore. 
Argued the other way around, two conceptions of justice that look different at first sight, might share one 
underlying concept. This is the line of thought that I shall follow in this paper, bridging two strands of 
thought in contemporary political philosophy: liberal egalitarianism and multiculturalism. Liberal 
egalitarianism focuses on welfare-state redistribution whereas multiculturalists focus on accommodation of 
                                                     
1 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” in Marx/Engels Selected Works in One Volume, ed. Karl Marx and 
Fredrich Engels (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1875), p. 321. 
2 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 6. 
3 Wibren van der Burg, “The Importance of Ideals,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1997), p. 29. 
4 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 134-136; John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 14, n. 15; Wibren van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief. Een 
verkenning van de normatieve grondslagen der democratie (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991), p. 125. 
5 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1986), p. 71. 
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social and cultural diversity. Although both strands of thought are dominant in contemporary political 
philosophy, there has been little cross-boundary public debate. They are generally seen as distinct paradigms, 
with different (and possibly contradicting) assumptions and methods – aptly summarized by Nancy Fraser as 
the dilemma between redistribution and recognition.6 Although one of the classics in multiculturalism, 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship, is defended as A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, liberals have not 
been too enthusiastic to include multiculturalists in their midst.7 Brian Barry, for example, claims that: “I 
have found that there is something approaching a consensus among those who do not write about it that the 
literature of multiculturalism is not worth wasting powder and shot on.”8  
 Instead, I shall argue that these two approaches have more in common than the liberal-egalitarian critics 
of multiculturalism, the ‘doctrinaire liberals’ like Barry, are willing to admit.9 Moreover, I shall argue that an 
ideal-oriented approach enables us to find this shared basis. The concept of equality shall be interpreted as an 
ideal that can bridge the divide between adversaries in this political-philosophical debate.10 Both approaches 
share the same concept of equality as the underlying ideal and they can be seen as consistent, equivalent, and 
non-conflicting conceptions thereof.  
2 The liberal concept of equality: equal respect and concern 
We can find a first formulation of the concept of equality in Ronald Dworkin’s work, namely his abstract 
egalitarian claim:  
I presume that we all accept the following postulates of political morality. Government must treat those 
whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and 
with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of 
how their lives should be lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with 
equal concern and respect.11 
This claim sums up three important elements of Dworkin’s approach. Firstly moral individualism. In our 
evaluation of government and its institutions we should only focus on the interests of the members of the 
                                                     
6 Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review 
212 (1995). 
7 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995). 
8 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), p. 6. 
9 Cf. the title of David Miller’s review of Barry’s book: Doctrinaire Liberalism versus Multicultural Democracy David 
Miller, “Doctrinaire Liberalism versus Multicultural Democracy,” review of Brian Barry’s “Culture and Equality”, 
Ethnicities 2, no. 2 (2002). 
10 (Van der Burg and Taekema: ***) 
11 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 272-273. 
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community.12 Only persons are seen as ‘ends in themselves’ unlike, e.g. tradition, the family, tribe or ethnic, 
cultural or religious communities. Secondly, impartiality. From a moral point of view, there are no privileged 
persons: everyone’s life has the same value.13 Therefore, each individual’s interests are equally important in 
our evaluation of institutions. Finally, Dworkin focuses on the role of government: the abstract egalitarian 
claim starts from the standpoint of politics. Government has an important role in providing the basic 
conditions, necessary for the well-being of its citizens: “equality as a political virtue demands … not only an 
attitude, but concrete institutions.”14 
3 A first conception of equality: equality of resources 
From 1981 onwards, Ronald Dworkin published four articles under the name “What is equality?” which 
have become classics in the literature on distributive justice. They are reprinted as the first four chapters in 
Sovereign Virtue.15 Dworkin provides a defense of the welfare state and his work has generated a rich 
literature on economic justice.16 Besides the abstract concept of equality – the abstract egalitarian claim – his 
work on redistributive justice also gives a conception thereof, namely equality of resources. 
 Dworkin develops his theory of distributive justice from a counterfactual example, an imaginary story in 
which a group of people is shipwrecked on a desert island with abundant resources. Dworkin seeks to 
demonstrate the role and effects of the abstract egalitarian claim in a ‘state of nature’, a situation in which 
immigrants have to make decisions about the design of their societal institutions. This detour via ideal theory 
is a common element in political philosophy.17 The idea is that one has to abstract from concrete situations in 
society to be able to formulate principles of justice. One starts by describing a hypothetical situation in which 
contingent and unjust institutional heritages of our actual world do not exist (e.g. accumulation of wealth in 
specific families, history of slavery, the feudal system). Moreover, other interfering issues of injustice are 
removed to focus only on the issue at hand. Such abstractions “are justified only because they enable us to 
focus on certain main questions free from distracting details.”18 Moreover, ideal theory can help us to 
formulate the line of action we should undertake, given the ideals we are committed to. Any observation of a 
gap between our ideals and political practice should not be seen as a critique of our ideals to be “unduly 
                                                     
12 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), p. 5. 
13 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th ed. (New York [etc.]: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 13. 
14 Ronald Dworkin, “Do Liberty and Equality conflict?,” in Living as Equals, ed. Paul Barker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 44. 
15 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. 
16 It is therefore important to distinguish Dworkin’s work and reputation in jurisprudence from his work and reputation 
in political philosophy – especially in the field of distributive justice. Here Dworkin inspired G.A. Cohen, John Roemer, 
Eric Rakowski, Richard Arneson, Derek Parfit and Philippe van Parijs, to name a few. 
17 Of course, Thomas More’s Utopia and John Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance are the most notorious examples of the use of 
ideal theory in political philosophy.  
18 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 12. 
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demanding in practice;” instead it be seen as “a critique of our practice as insufficiently attentive to our 
principles.”19 
Once the ‘principles of justice’ have been formulated in this ideal situation, they are used as criteria in our 
evaluation of justice in the real world. Ideal theory should “provide some guidance in thinking about 
nonideal theory, and so about difficult cases how to deal with existing injustices. It should also help to clarify 
the goal of reform and to identify which wrongs are more grievous and hence more urgent to correct.”20 The 
inherent hypothetical character of ideal theory is not by default a disqualifier. Quentin Skinner argues that 
ideal theory can show us what line of action we should undertake, given the ideals we are committed to.21  
 Dworkin assumes that the shipwrecked people on the utopian island agree that “no one is antecedently 
entitled to any of these resources, but that they shall instead be divided equally among them.”22 Their 
deliberation proceeds in two steps. The first contains an auction in which the resources, available on the 
island (ground, cattle etc.) are divided equally amongst the shipwrecked.23 In the second stage, institutions 
are developed to preserve this equal distribution of resources in a dynamic economy with labor, investment 
and trade.24 Dworkin asserts that the deliberations of the immigrants will result in a rule of fair distribution 
that he summarizes as follows: 
[W]e must … recognize that the requirements of equality pull in opposite directions. On the one hand we 
must … allow the distribution of resources at any particular moment to be (as we might say) ambition-
sensitive. It must, that is, reflect the cost or benefit to others of the choices people make so that, for 
example, those who choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less expensively rather than more, 
or to work in more rather than less profitable ways, must be permitted to retain the gains that flow from 
these decisions in an equal auction followed by free trade. But on the other hand, we must not allow the 
distribution of resources at any moment to be endowment-sensitive, that is, to be affected by differences in 
ability of the sort that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among people with the same 
ambitions.25 
This formulation exemplifies again Dworkin’s statocentric approach. Since a distribution of resources in a 
laissez-faire society is not choice-sensitive and endowment-insensitive by default, the implicit argument here 
is that the ideal of equality presupposes a clear role for government. The government should aim at a choice-
sensitive distribution of resources, for example by supporting personal autonomy, fighting monopolies, and 
formulating anti-trust laws26. Moreover it should strive for the endowment-insensitivity of the distribution of 
                                                     
19 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 79. 
20 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
p. 13. 
21 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 78-79. 
22 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 66-67. 
23 Ibid., pp. 5-71. 
24 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
25 Ibid., p. 89. 
26 Ibid., pp. 120-183. 
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resources. Dworkin focuses on two unchosen endowments in particular: handicaps and lack of talents. His 
redistributive approach focuses on the limited individual earning capacities resulting from these 
endowments. To this effect Dworkin proposes a “periodic redistribution of resources through some form of 
income tax.”27 
 Moreover, this formulation of the conception of equality is entirely phrased in terms of distribution of 
resources; it is essentially a theory of distributive or economic equality.28 Dworkin simply takes for granted 
that justice requires the equal distribution of something.29 “Our final aim is that an equal share of resources 
[is] devoted to the lives of each person.”30 Dworkin’s preoccupation with distributive justice can be 
understood in the light of the circumstance that the paper is written in the mid-1970s, as a defense of welfare 
state arrangements against attacks inspired by libertarians.31 As a result, Dworkin’s theory is (generally 
interpreted as) primarily a defense of distributive justice. However, as I shall argue, distributive justice is 
only one interpretation of, and anchored in the more general ideal of equality. 
4 A reformulation of the liberal concept of equality 
I have described Dworkin’s work in terms of a concept of equality – claiming that government should treat 
its citizens with equal respect and concern and a conception thereof – his assertion that government should 
strive for a distribution of resources in society is both choice-sensitive and endowment-insensitive. Although 
the maxim of equal respect and concern is clear in its intention, it does not give much direction.32 In this 
section I will reformulate the concept of equality by including elements of its conception as presented in 
section 3, without also including its distributive focus. The concept of equality can be formulated as follows: 
Inequalities in the advantages people enjoy due to choices about the good life are seen as part of the 
personal autonomy and responsibility and therefore morally legitimate. Inequalities in the advantages 
people enjoy that derive from unchosen features of their endowments are seen as morally arbitrary and 
therefore generate a responsibility for government to remedy this inequality. 
The assertion that government should distinguish in its policies between choice-sensitivity and endowment-
insensitivity is implicit in the abstract egalitarian claim, given the emphasis of respect and concern. The idea 
that government should treat citizens with equal respect demands that choice involves personal 
responsibility. Government should respect the autonomy of individuals and therefore not interfere with 
personal preferences or ambitions by force or manipulation. As a result, persons themselves are responsible 
for (the formation of) their aims, ambitions, and decisions and, therefore, the consequences thereof. 
                                                     
27 Ibid., pp. 90-91, see also 92-109. 
28 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 135. 
29 Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” (paper presented at the Center for Politics, Law, and Society Seminar 
Series, University College London, London, 23 January 2002), p. 11. 
30 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 84-85. 
31 E.g. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
32 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 135. 
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Therefore equal respect implies that government should make a big effort to ensure that citizens bear the true 
costs and benefits of their choices and decisions. 
 The idea that government should treat citizens with equal concern demands that endowments induce 
collective responsibility. In the case of endowments there is no moment in which a person, through choosing, 
can make a difference, instead, endowments simply involve brute bad luck. The concept of equality demands 
that government has a duty to act to compensate adverse consequences of unchosen endowments – e.g. 
limited individual earning capacities resulting from handicaps and lack of talent. Of course, nor every 
inequality can be rectified, or only at too high a cost. The paradigmatic example is the forced transfer of 
body parts, e.g. when a sighted person has to donate one eye to a blind person. In this case the remedy is seen 
as worse than the disease because it wrongfully interferes with the bodily integrity of the sighted person.  
 In this way, the abstract egalitarian claim implies a division of responsibility between individuals and 
government. It is a formulation of equality as an ideal: it is a value that is never completely realizable, 
because it is a “compromise of two conflicting requirements of equality, in the face of both practical and 
conceptual uncertainty how to satisfy these requirements.”33 Moreover, this ideal of equality plays a role in 
justifying decisions and opinions, since it is the background against which equality of resources is 
defended.34 
 Moreover, this formulation of the ideal of equality is a concept in the concept/conception distinction as 
described in the introduction, because it is abstract enough to generate general support.35 “The best, perhaps 
the only, argument for the egalitarian principle lies in the implausibility of denying any of the components 
that make it up….”36 Indeed, only racists might be capable of doing so.37  
5 Is socioeconomic distribution the only valid conception of equality? 
The importance of the conceptual contribution by liberal-egalitarians on distributive justice is undisputed. 
But they have been criticized for limiting the ideal of equal respect and concern, to this narrow scope of 
distributive justice. Doing so, they have ignored many issues, central in current political debates, such as 
social and cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Iris Marion Young claims that, although “distributive 
issues are crucial to a satisfactory conception of justice, … it is a mistake to reduce social justice to 
                                                     
33 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 91. 
34 (Van der Burg and Taekema: ***) 
35 Will Kymlicka uses the abstract egalitarian claim as the founding idea of his textbook on contemporary political 
philosophy. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 1-9, esp. 3-4. It should be seen as an egalitarian plateau against which differential theories can be 
compared. Libertarians, for example, could argue that the interests of the members of society are best guaranteed by an 
extensive interpretation of equal self-ownership rights. 
36 Ronald Dworkin, “In Defense of Equality,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1, no. 1 (1983), p. 32. 
37 But, again, racists presuppose equality amongst ‘whites’ and ‘blacks,’ so even racists cannot escape the egalitarian 
logic.  
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redistribution.”38 Elisabeth Anderson claims that Dworkin and other liberal-egalitarians neglect “the much 
broader agendas of actual egalitarian political movements” discussing, for example, racial and gender 
inequality, etc. Therefore she claims that they have a flawed understanding of equality and precisely miss 
“the point of equality.”39 Kymlicka argues that most countries today are culturally diverse and that this 
diversity gives rise to a series of important and potentially divisive questions. ”Finding morally defensible 
and politically viable answers to these issue is the greatest challenge facing democracies today.”40 However, 
this challenge is not answered by contemporary liberal egalitarians: because they “have operated with an 
idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens share a common descent, language, and culture.” 
Moreover, they seem to assume that “the culturally homogeneous city-states of Ancient Greece provided the 
essential or standard model of a political community.”41 Indeed, the issue of distributive justice has 
dominated current liberal egalitarianism whereas the issue of cultural diversity has long been ignored. I agree 
with Samuel Scheffler’s conclusion that: 
[U]nless the relations between distributive norms and broader ideals of equality are kept firmly in view, the 
putatively artificial device of treating distributive equality as an independent topic can all too easily take on 
a life of its own, and the inquiry can lose touch with what is ultimately at stake when questions of 
distribution are debated. The trajectory of the luck-egalitarian literature over the years seems to me to 
provide a clear illustration of this danger.42 
Socioeconomic redistribution has dominated liberal egalitarianism while other conceptions of equality have 
been ignored. Multiculturalism, for example, has also been an important strand in political philosophy, but 
excluded from the egalitarian circle. One can doubt whether this exclusive attitude by luck egalitarians is 
justified. Dworkin explicitly acknowledges that distributive equality “is only one aspect of the more general 
problem of equality, because it sets aside a variety of issues that might be called, by way of contrast, issues 
about political equality.”43 Moreover he argues that:  
Distributional equality, as I describe it, is not concerned with the distribution of political power, for 
example, or with individual rights other than rights to some amount or share of resources. It is obvious, I 
think, that these questions I throw together under the label of political equality are not so independent from 
issues of distributional equality as the distinction might suggest … But it nevertheless seems likely that a 
full theory of equality, embracing a range of issues including political and distributional equality, is best 
approached by accepting initial, even though somewhat arbitrary, distinctions among these issues.44 
                                                     
38 Iris Marion Young, “A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s Ethnic-Nation Dichotomy,” 
Constellations 4, no. 4 (1997), p. 16. 
39 Elisabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics 109 (1999), p. 288. 
40 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 1. 
41 Ibid., p. 2. 
42 Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” pp. 25-26. 
43 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 12. 
44 Ibid., pp. 12, emphasis added. 
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The application of the abstract egalitarian claim in the imaginary story of the shipwrecked is a helpful ideal-
theoretical tool to illustrate the intuitive strength of the choice-endowment distinction. In this hypothetical 
society, Dworkin tailors his cases and argues from trivial examples. This enables him to demonstrate the 
logic of the choice-endowment distinction. In his examples the endowment-element is so evident that the 
choice-element is locked out and vise versa. So, equality of resources is not a set of first principles. Instead, 
it is one conception of equality, an important one, that is also used as an example to spell out of the more 
general concept of equality.45 
 Brian Barry, on the other hand, is convinced that equality and multiculturalism have nothing in common. 
He argues that multiculturalism takes away the attention from the really important issue, namely socio-
economic inequalities.46 He warns us that the “whole thrust” of multiculturalism is “that it seeks to withdraw 
from individual members of minority groups the protections that are normally offered by liberal states.”47 
And indeed, some multicultural claims might be focused on cultures themselves and therefore inconsistent 
with moral individualism.48 But, as I will argue in the next section, there is no intrinsic incompatibility 
between multiculturalism and liberal egalitarianism. 
6 Multiculturalism as a second conception of equality 
Dworkin has simplified the examples in the ‘fable of the shipwrecked’ to clarify the choice-circumstance 
distinction. However, outside ideal theory, and especially in the context of multicultural societies, the choice-
endowment distinction, so clear as an analytical device, gets blurred. I will discuss the notions of choice and 
endowment concepts in turn. 
6.1 Reconsidering Endowments 
Iris Marion Young argues that liberal-egalitarians have focused too much on the question what should be 
distributed equally – resources, welfare, opportunities for welfare, access to advantage, etc.49 The result is 
that liberals neglected the flipside of the egalitarian coin, namely, the question of equality of whom. If we 
claim that people should be treated with equal respect and concern, which categories or groups of people are 
we discussing? Precisely this question, ignored by liberal egalitarians, is central to many actual political 
debates in multiculturalism. These debates start by comparing actual social and cultural groups: women and 
men, whites and people of color, members of minority and majority religious groups, etc. In these 
discussions, the language of redistribution of resources is not very helpful. Young seeks to provide an 
                                                     
45 Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” p. 25. 
46 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 63-64. 
47 Ibid., p. 326. 
48 Examples are Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. 
Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and 
the Right to Culture,” Social Research 61, no. 3 (1994). 
49 Iris Marion Young, “Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2001). 
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alternative approach and therefore she focuses on the question “whether and how such group-conscious 
practices of assessing inequality are justified.”50 
 In her evaluation of liberal-egalitarians, Young focuses on the individualistic character of their approach. 
On the one hand she endorses that “the ultimate purpose of making assessments of inequality is to promote 
the well-being of individuals considered as irreducible moral equals.”51 That is, she shares the liberal 
egalitarian moral individualism (see sect. 2). Moreover, she endorses the intuitions towards endowments and 
choices, as conceptualized in the ideal of equality, and the importance of their distinction in a normative 
framework.52 
 However, she criticizes the liberal-egalitarian methodological individualism, that is, the claim that only 
individual choices and endowments can cause morally relevant inequalities. Indeed, Dworkin’s 
conceptualization of endowment, is very individualistic, only concentrating on physical and mental 
characteristics of the person: physical and mental powers, genetic predisposition to particular diseases, and 
personal resources of health, strength, and talent.53 For this reason, we could name them natural 
endowments. Young argues that many other instances of injustice cannot be understood if one only focuses 
on individual attributes of personal inability.  
Instead, the causes of many inequalities of resources or opportunities among individuals lie in social 
institutions, their rules and relations, and the decisions others make within them that affect the lives of the 
individuals compared.54 
Evaluating inequality in terms of social groups enables us to claim that some situations are unjust, although 
they cannot be recognized as unjust in the framework of distributive justice. Also Kymlicka argues that since 
no one chooses to be born in a minority culture, the choice-endowment logic demands that they should 
somehow be seen as an endowment. Therefore the concept of endowments should not only include natural 
endowments but also elements of one’s social environment.55 
Group-based evaluations are helpful because they reveal inegalitarian effects of institutional relations and 
processes in society.56 To acknowledge these (inegalitarian) effects of institutions, we have to understand 
social mechanisms and social structures. Social mechanisms are well-established and recurring patterns of 
                                                     
50 Ibid., p. 1. 
51 Ibid., p. 6. 
52 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
53 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 81, 287 and 322. 
54 Young, “Equality of Whom?,” p. 8. 
55 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 186-188. In this book 
Kymlicka attempts to defend attention for cultural difference by adjusting Dworkin’s model of the shipwrecked 
immigrants in such a way that not one but two – culturally different – groups of shipwrecked arrive at the island 
simultaneously. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, pp. 192-194. 
56 Young, “Equality of Whom?,” p. 2. 
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behavior in society.57 The working of social mechanisms cannot be reduced to discernable individuals and 
their considerations and preferences. Instead, it must be understood in terms of interpersonal processes, 
conventions, social norms, and herding. Over time, these social mechanisms have resulted in social 
structures. A social structure can be described as the way in which social life is organized into predictable 
relationships and patterns of social interaction – including social positions and the related status and role 
differentiation between them. Social structures are the inevitable result of living together and social 
cooperation. Results of social structures are social institutions such as the educational system, the welfare 
state, legal, economic and political institutions, and the geographical layout of cities. The complex of social 
structures in society can be brought together under the name of basic structure of society.  
 The options and possibilities, available to individuals are not only determined by their natural 
endowments – as discussed by liberal-egalitarians – but also by the way society is organized. John Rawls 
argues that the basic structure of society:  
… [C]ontains various social positions and … men born into different positions have different expectations 
of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this 
way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep 
inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in life.”58  
Rawls mainly focuses on socio-economic inequalities between classes, whereas multiculturalists broaden the 
analysis to group-differentiations of gender, ethnicity, sexual preference, and other “ascribed characteristics 
that historically served as markers of inferiority and exclusion. … Categories such as these name groups 
[that] are positioned by social structures that constrain and enable lives in a way that is largely beyond their 
individual control.”59 These inequalities are caused by social mechanisms and social structures and are 
structural inequalities because:  
They describes a set of relationships among assumptions and stereotypes, institutional policies, individual 
actions following rules or choosing in self-interest, and collective consequences of these things, which 
constrain the options of some at the same time as they expand the options of others.60 
The resulting inequalities are not reducible to individual characteristics, since they typically affect 
individuals because they are members of a specific group. They “are positioned by social structures that 
constrain and enable individual lives beyond their individual control.”61 Understanding behavior in terms of 
social mechanisms reveals that “people themselves treat others as group members, and that the product of 
many such actions sometimes results in structural inequalities.”62 Social structures make that individuals, 
                                                     
57 Although they do not need to have a law-like causal necessity. 
58 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7. 
59 Young, “Equality of Whom?,” pp. 4, 6. 
60 Ibid., p. 11. 
61 Ibid., p. 6. 
62 Ibid., p. 17. 
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“despite any good intentions they might have, act and react in a way that has the aggregate effect of 
structural inequality.”63  
 So, besides inequalities caused by natural endowments, such as handicaps and lack of talent, we can 
identify inequality caused by what we could call societal endowments.64 They are named societal 
endowments because someone’s gender, color of skin, etc., are unchosen elements of one’s being that affect 
one’s options and chances. A societal endowment does not in itself determine someone’s life inescapably, in 
the way natural endowments do – e.g. the inability to see. Societal endowments affect the situation of 
persons via “social structures that involuntarily position people, constraining some more than others and 
privileging some more than others.”65 
 This implies that it is very well possible for multiculturalists to start from the ideal of equality and 
embrace the idea that endowments generate morally relevant inequalities. But they do not use the detour of 
ideal theory; instead they focus on real-life issues of injustice, and broaden the concept of morally relevant 
endowments, by also acknowledging societal endowments. However, societal endowments are less 
straightforward to recognize. Dworkin restricts himself to useful and clear-cut examples of endowments, and 
his ideal-theoretical approach enables him to argue in a clear deductive cause-effect logic: endowments 
cause inequality. Once we have discovered the morally relevant endowments, we can identify the correlating 
categories of persons between whom government should redistribute resources. However, societal 
endowments cannot be explained in such straightforward cause-effect logic. Although we can observe clear 
differential positions of social groups in society – for example between men and women or people of color 
and whites – it is less obvious to recognize the cause of that inequality, and whether this cause is a choice or 
an endowment. This is not a distinction of strong and weak theories, but, instead, a result of differences 
between ideal theory – deliberately excluding ambiguous cases – and non-ideal theories for the real world. 
As mentioned above, Dworkin tailored his cases to exemplify the logic of the ideal of equality.  
 In itself, there is nothing wrong with (starting with) straightforward examples: usually they are the best 
illustrations of a theoretical position. The multicultural analysis, however, goes one step further, by using the 
liberal egalitarian ideal-theoretical framework to evaluate less straightforward cases. In these cases we need 
an inductive method and to argue in an inverse logic: from evident result, namely inequalities to possible 
causes, namely societal endowments. To be sure that these inequalities are morally relevant, we have to 
formulate some requirements to confirm that they are really caused by unchosen societal endowments.66 
Firstly, it should be observable that a specific category of individuals is unequal to others on certain 
important measures of well-being. The groups evaluated should be “generally recognized social positions” in 
the basic structure of society. Second, we need to give a plausible explanation for the observed inequality in 
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terms of societal endowments: “about how the relations, rules, expectations, and cumulative consequences of 
collective action specifically condition the lives of that group.” Finally, we need a plausible explanation how 
the social mechanisms and the social structures account for observed inequalities. “We must explain how 
institutional rules and policies, individual actions and interactions, and the cumulative collective and often 
unintended material effects of these relations reinforce one another in ways that restrict the opportunities of 
some to achieve well-being in the respect measured, while it does not so restrict that of the others to whom 
they are compared, or even enlarge their opportunities. This story will be aided, moreover, by evidence that 
the basic configuration of the patterns shows little change over decades.”67 
 Let me conclude. In section 4 I formulated the endowment part of the ideal of equality as follows: 
Inequalities in the advantages people enjoy that derive from unchosen features of their endowments are seen 
as morally arbitrary and therefore generate a responsibility for government to remedy this inequality. 
Besides morally relevant inequalities generated by natural endowments as discussed by liberal egalitarians, 
in multicultural societies we can also encounter morally relevant inequalities generated by societal 
endowments. The latter are as much unchosen features of a person’s circumstances and are in line with the 
concept of equality as presented in section 3. 
6.2 Reconsidering choices 
In section 4 we saw that the notion of equal respect is strongly connected to choice. It was argued that 
government should respect personal autonomy and not interfere with the relations between preferences, ideas 
about the good life, the successive choices made, and the effects of these choices. Although choice is an 
important element in Dworkin’s theory, the concept itself is hardly elaborated. It can be described in three 
features.68 First, choosing requires a choice set: a number of options (at least two) from which to can choose. 
Secondly, choosing depends on preferences: “comparative evaluative attitudes that permit the agent to rank 
the various elements in the choice-set in terms of their relative desirability.” Thirdly, choosing consists in a 
selection process: ranking the options and picking out the most preferred option.69  
 In ideal theory, individual choice is – by default – unproblematic. However, the capacity to make choices 
in a rational and informed way is not innate, instead, it must be developed in the course of one’s upbringing 
and education. This raises questions of social and cultural preconditions of choice, that are dealt with in Will 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship. His aim is “to show that the liberal value of freedom of choice has 
certain cultural preconditions, and hence that issues of cultural membership must be incorporated into liberal 
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principles.”70 The theoretical background against which Kymlicka develops his Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights is liberal egalitarianism, as defended by Dworkin and Rawls.71 Moreover he endorses the choice-
endowment distinction as described by Dworkin and formulated here as the ideal of equality.72  
 To what extent are choice and culture related? “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst 
various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to 
us.”73 Individuals make choices on the basis of their preferences: beliefs about the value of several options. 
But where do these beliefs come from? The freedom of choice is not “free-floating in the void.”74  
To have a belief about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meaning 
attached to it by our culture. … The availability of meaningful options depends on access to a societal 
culture, and on understanding the history and language of that culture – its ‘shared vocabulary of tradition 
and convention.75 
So both individual preferences and the selection process are influenced by upbringing and socialization in a 
societal culture, defined by Kymlicka as: “A culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of 
life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and 
economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially-
concentrated, and based on a shared language.”76 This societal culture serves as the context of individual 
choice, and therefore provides the institutional background for individual freedom of choice. 
 Liberal-egalitarians do not disagree here.77 Dworkin, for example, argues that culture “provides the 
spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable”78 and therefore: “We inherited a cultural 
structure, and we have some duty, out of simple justice, to leave that structure at least as rich as we found 
it.”79 Kymlicka and Dworkin disagree, however, about the question whether this societal culture is equally 
available. Dworkin assumes the borders of the societal culture overlap with the borders of nation states. He 
tends to think of culture as a kind of societal “public good” – important but equally available to all members 
of society, and therefore unproblematic from an egalitarian point of view. Dworkin never makes this 
assumption explicitly, but it seems implicit throughout his work, and this could explain why he never 
                                                     
70 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76. 
71 Ibid., p. Ch. 5. 
72 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, pp. 38, 186; Multicultural Citizenship, pp. Ch.5, esp. pp. 80-82; 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. ch.4. 
73 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 83. 
74 Ibid., p. 76. 
75 Ibid., pp. 76 & 83, referring to Dworkin. 
76 Ibid., p. 76. 
77 Dworkin discusses this subject in Ronald Dworkin, “Liberal Community,” California Law Review 77, no. 3 (1989); 
“Can a Liberal State Support Art?,” in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1985). 
78 Dworkin, “Can a Liberal State Support Art?,” p. 228. 
79 Ibid., pp. 232-233. 
page 14 of 17 
discusses the potential for inequality stemming from cultural differences. It is reflected in several passing 
references he makes to citizens sharing a common language and culture, having “a shared vocabulary of 
tradition and convention.”80 He also suggests that the United States contains a single “cultural structure” 
based on and related to a “shared language.”81 Kymlicka emphasizes the multicultural character of 
contemporary liberal democratic societies. He distinguishes two main sources of cultural diversity. The first 
is multi-nationality, which refers to the coexistence of more than one nation within a state, where ‘nation’ 
means a historical community more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, 
sharing a distinct language and culture.82 Examples of multi-national states are Belgium (inhabited by 
Walloons, Flemish and a small German nation) and, of course, Canada (inhabited by an Anglophone and a 
Francophone nation and Aboriginal groups). The second form of cultural diversity is poly-ethnicity, which 
refers to a diversity in society as a result of immigration of individuals and families from other states (and 
cultures) and who are allowed “to maintain some of their ethnic particularity.”83 Examples of immigration 
countries are Canada, the United States and Australia. Described this way, states can be both multi-national 
and poly-ethnic – as for example Canada is.  
 Culture as a context of choice is not a matter-of-course for national minorities and ethnic minorities. 
Kymlicka asserts governments should support national minorities which seek to preserve their distinct 
societal culture and support ethnic groups that seek to integrate into the dominant societal culture of their 
new state, while maintaining their ethnic distinctiveness. Kymlicka discusses three sorts of rights to support 
the culture as a context of choice for these minority groups.84 Kymlicka’s work is in line with the choice-
element of the ideal of equality: 
Inequalities in the advantages people enjoy due to choices about the good life are seen as part of the 
personal autonomy and responsibility and therefore morally legitimate. 
Kymlicka emphasizes the fact of cultural diversity in contemporary societies as potential cause of inequality 
that is ignored by Dworkin and other liberal egalitarians. Multi-nationality and poly-ethnicity undermines the 
liberal assumption that all members of society share one single context of choice. Since choices are made in 
a cultural environment, and since these contexts of choice differ in multicultural societies, the choice-
endowment distinction, so clear as an analytical device, is complicated outside the context of ideal theory in 
real multicultural societies. Therefore Kymlicka uses Dworkin’s emphasis on choice to defend group-
specific rights for minority groups.  
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7 The relation between the two conceptions of equality 
Let me recapitulate the argument so far. I have given a concept of equality – the ideal propagating that 
government should protect individual autonomy and responsibility and eliminate unchosen inequalities – and 
two conceptions thereof: socioeconomic redistribution in the welfare state and the accommodation of cultural 
difference in the multicultural society. The latter conception proposes some adaptations of the first. In a 
multicultural context, the term ‘endowment’ should not only include natural endowments but also societal 
endowments, whereas ‘choice’ presupposes a cultural context and that therefore the acknowledgement of 
cultural diversity generates unchosen inequalities between members of different cultural groups. 
 Let me discuss one possible counterargument against my analysis. One could object that I interpret the 
liberal-egalitarian conception of equality too narrowly in terms of socioeconomic redistribution. Dworkin, 
for example, is not only well known for his What is Equality? articles, but is also one of the most prominent 
defenders of the legality and justifiability of race and gender conscious policies of affirmative action.85 One 
could argue that I overstate the dichotomy liberal-egalitarian and multiculturalism by interpreting liberal 
egalitarianism too narrowly. Let me discuss this argument by evaluating Dworkin’s work. Within the context 
of redistributive justice, Dworkin firmly holds on to the methodological individualism. Equality of resources 
(willfully) ignores socially generated inequalities, because “it aims to provide a description of (or rather a set 
of devices for aiming at) equality of resources person by person, and the considerations of each person’s 
history that affect what he should have, in the name of equality, do not include his membership in any 
economic or social class. … [Therefore, equality of resources] proposes that equality is in principle a matter 
of individual right rather than one of group position.” He also emphasizes the strict individualist 
considerations underlying the choice-endowment distinction since it is based on “judgments about particular 
people’s particular tastes and ambitions, in the interests of giving them what they are, as individuals, entitled 
to have, rather than as part of any premise that equality is the matter of equality between groups.”86 One 
could thus argue that equality of resources is insensitive to issues of cultural diversity.  
 In his work, Dworkin draws a principled and hierarchical distinction between equality of resources and 
affirmative action, based on his distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘principle.’ For Dworkin, a policy is a 
standard that sets out a goal to be reached, which is to be evaluated (only) in terms of the common good. A 
principle is a standard that is to be observed, not because enforcing it promotes the common good, but, 
instead, because it is a requirement of justice or fairness.87 Policy decisions, on the other hand, might have 
unfavorable effects on persons, but do not violate their rights. For example, the rights of an impassioned 
swimmer are not violated if a city council, in making a policy decision between spending money on a 
swimming pool or a opera house, chooses to subsidize the latter. In general, policy decisions can only be 
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assessed in consequentialist terms: which policy does the best job in increasing the common good? Dworkin 
claims that affirmative action programs, that is, issues of cultural diversity, are not a matter of principle but 
of policy.88 The rights of whites, disadvantaged by affirmative action programs, are not infringed by that 
policy; on the other hand, blacks do not have a right to compel government to adopt such policies. That 
explains why Dworkin treats these issues separately: the issue of resource equality is seen as a requirement 
of justice and affirmative action as a matter of policy.  
 Andrew Altman has argued that Dworkin does not offer enough good reasons to maintain this distinction 
and claims that affirmative action should also be interpreted in terms of principles.89 I agree with Altman; as 
I have argued in this chapter, socioeconomic redistribution and accommodation of cultural difference share 
the same concept of equality as the underlying ideal and can be seen as consistent and equivalent conceptions 
thereof. It is interesting that Dworkin now accepts – in his own ambiguous way – that the distinction can no 
longer be maintained. In his reply to Altman, Dworkin writes:  
I agree that government has an obligation to treat all those subject to its dominion with equal concern, and 
that a government that does nothing to redress structural discrimination fails in that obligation. … It is true 
… that without some direct and positive action the American governments fail in their responsibilities to 
treat all citizens as equals, and that is a matter of principle and not just policy.”90 
This seems to be an indirect way for Dworkin to admit that cultural difference is of normative importance 
and should be included in the normative framework of liberal egalitarianism.  
8 Conclusion: is an Ideal-oriented Approach Helpful in Normative Debates? 
In this chapter I have used an ideal-oriented approach to discuss the contemporary debate on equality. I 
followed assertion of the editors that we can understand normative debates as debates between different 
interpretations of the same ideal. At first sight there is a vast difference between the redistributive and the 
multicultural conception of equality. However, after distilling the more general ideal of equality, it was very 
well possible to understand the connection between their theories.  
 Although we should not overstate its effect, I think an ideal-oriented approach is helpful in analyzing 
debates in political philosophy. This chapter makes clear that an ideal-oriented approach is very helpful in 
reflecting on relations between different theories. Young and Kymlicka use the concept of equality to defend 
their position, however, their approach is very different from the mainstream liberal-egalitarian defenses. So 
an ideal-oriented approach is a helpful conceptual tool in analyzing debates in political philosophy because 
in this debate it provided a common frame of reference. I therefore assume that the editors mean conceptual 
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improvement when argue that: “In normative theory, recognition of the role of ideals is basically recognition 
of room for improvement.”91  
 The strength of the ideal-oriented approach is its ability to clarify ongoing debates, by separating the 
abstract concepts and ideals from their application in actual policy debates. In the case of liberal egalitarians, 
the emphasis on the underlying ideal of equality enables us to criticize their single minded focus on socio-
economic redistribution: why would this be the only legitimate interpretation of the maxim of equal respect 
and concern? In this sense, an ideal oriented approach is helpful for separating the rhetoric from the content. 
In the case of multiculturalism, this emphasis on the abstract egalitarian claim as the maxim of Young’s and 
Kymlicka’s claims is helpful in distinguishing their claims from more communitarian defenses of the 
recognition of identity groups, based on Hegel’s work, as presented by for example Charles Taylor and Axel 
Honneth.92 Moreover, it shows the relations between Young and Kymlicka on the one hand, and liberal-
egalitarians on the other on the other hand. So an ideal-oriented approach is helpful because it elucidates a 
debate, clarifies the diverse positions, and reveal differences and (unlooked-for) similarities between 
different positions.  
 The question remains, however, what the ‘ideal’-component adds to the more general idea of ‘concept.’ 
The distinction between concept and conception is the cornerstone of my paper, however, one could ask why 
this would support the claim that ideals are important. My answer is twofold. For one thing, he notion of 
‘concept’ is more appropriate in conceptual and descriptive theories, whereas the notion of ‘ideal’ fits better 
in normative theories. Moreover, concepts can be formulated and defined very precisely  – if so desired, 
provisionally or formal. Concepts refer to agreements to formulate specific issues within a theory in a 
specific way. Ideals, on the other hand, always refer to substantive ideas and transcend every attempt to 
enclose it in one single formulation.93 Ideals can only be formulated within a specific context, e.g. the context 
of socioeconomic redistribution or the context of cultural diversity. None of these conceptions are a complete 
interpretation of the general ideal, and together they do not exhaust all possible interpretations of the ideal. 
To conclude: the concept of ‘ideal’ differs substantively from the concept of ‘concept’ and my discussion in 








                                                     
91 Introduction to this volume 7 and 16.  
92 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.”; Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
93 Wibren van der Burg, “The Morality of Aspiration,” in Rediscovering Fuller. Essays on Implicit Law and 
Institutional Design, ed. Willem Witteveen and Wibren van der Burg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 
pp. 177-178. 
